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There are numerous problems in DoD software development projects. The ad hoc
practices used in the military services and in industry have resulted in unpredictable costs
and schedules and low-quality products. This thesis proposes that one solution to these
problems is to integrate Software Process Improvement (SPI) activities based on a proven
model into software development projects. Both a formal and an informal approach to
SPI will be discussed. The thesis will also describe not only the problems encountered in
most software development projects, but also the activities defined in these SPI
approaches that are designed to solve these problems. A case study of a military project
that has spent several years implementing SPI activities based on Software Engineering
Institute's (SEI) Capability Maturity Model (CMM) is presented. The SPI activities were
implemented in an effort to deliver a high quality product with high reliability while
maintaining a high level of control of costs and schedule. This project has succeeded in
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Today's major defense systems depend largely on the quality of complex and
increasingly costly software. Many major weapon systems cannot operate if the software
fails to function as required. Because software errors can cause a system to fail, possibly
with life-threatening consequences, software-intensive systems need to be thoroughly
tested before production. Since the early 1970s, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
has reported problems in operational test and evaluation of defense acquisition programs.
Senior DoD officials, as well as Members of the Congress, are concerned that many of
these problems continue today, particularly in software-intensive systems. [Ref. 1]
DoD software costs totaled over $30 billion a year in 1993 (estimated to be $42
billion by 1995), ofwhich about two-thirds was for maintaining, upgrading, and
modifying operational systems already in production. In contrast, the cost of computer
hardware components that are integral to weapon systems and other critical military and
intelligence systems are expected to remain stable at about $6 billion annually between
1990 and 1995. [Ref. 1]
According to a 1992 report by the Secretary of the Air Force, virtually all
software-intensive defense systems suffer from difficulties in achieving cost, schedule,
and performance objectives. It has been repeatedly demonstrated during operation testing
and, in some cases, during operations in the field, that these systems do not meet user
requirements. Most of these software problems could have been identified and addressed
during earlier development testing. [Ref. 1]
In December 1992, GAO reported that DoD's mission-critical computer systems
continued to have significant software problems due in part to a lack ofmanagement
attention, ill-defined requirements, and inadequate testing. [Ref. 1]
A 1979 GAO report states: [Ref. 2]
- > 50% of contracts had cost overruns
- > 60% of contracts had schedule overruns
- > 45% of software could not be used
- > 29% of software was never delivered
- > 19% of software had to be reworked
- ~ 3% of software had to be modified
- < 2% of software was usable as delivered
An unpublished review of 17 major DoD software contracts found that the
average 28-month schedule was missed by 20 months. One four-year project was not
delivered for seven years; no project was on time. Deployment of the Bl bomber was
delayed by a software problem, and the $58 billion A12 aircraft program was canceled
partly for the same reason. [Ref. 3]
One recent GAO report summarized more than 20 GAO case studies involving
software or software-related problems in the military and concluded, "The understanding
of software as a product and of software development as a process is not keeping pace
with the growing complexity and software dependence of existing and emerging mission-
critical systems." [Ref. 3]
The problems in DoD software development projects are numerous. The issues
involved and some of the most common problems encountered in software development
will be discussed in the next few sections of the thesis. I propose that one solution to
these problems is to integrate Software Process Improvement (SPI) activities based on a
proven model into software development projects. The model that is used at Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego (SSC-SD) is the Software Engineering
Institute's (SEI) Capability Maturity Model (CMM). A less formal approach, called
Rapid Application Development (RAD) will also be discussed as a solution to improving
small software projects. This thesis also contains a case study of a project at SSC-SD
using the CMM.
Based on a consensus ofmany experts and much literature in this field, an
organization's chance for success depends first on having an exceptional manager and an
effective development team (PEOPLE). Secondly, it depends on its effective use of
TECHNOLOGY, and finally, on its PROCESS maturity. [Ref. 4] In a software
organization:
PEOPLE refers to the attributes of the personnel responsible for managing,
performing, or overseeing the development and maintenance of their software products.
Management commitment and ability to hire and retain competent people are the most
crucial elements in predicting an organization's success.
TECHNOLOGY refers to the tools, languages, information, applications, and
environments needed to develop and maintain software.
PROCESS refers to the way people approach software development and
maintenance. Process is a particular method of doing something, generally involving a
number of steps or operations. A software process consists of methods, activities, plans,
practices, procedures, and steps used to produce and maintain software. It is the fiber
that connects people to technology and allows them to effectively use their technology.
Process maturity is how well a process is defined, managed, measured, and controlled,
and how effective it is. Software process maturity is an indicator of software
development capability. The quality of a software system is governed by the quality of
the process used to develop it.
Of the three, talented people are, by far, the most important element of any
software organization. But organizations must strive for balance between good software
engineering processes; the proper, although not necessarily the most current technology;
and competent management of their workforce. [Ref. 4]

II. ISSUES INVOLVED IN SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
According to [Ref. 5], a system is defined as "a« integrated composite ofpeople,
products, andprocesses that provide a capability to satisfy a stated need or objective.'"''
The elements making up the system are a database, documentation, people, procedures,
software, firmware, and hardware. Some of the software development issues are:
Selecting an organization and team structure. As stated in [Ref. 2], the purpose
of an organizational structure is to focus the efforts ofmany to a selected goal. The
program/project manager selects the optimum project structure for the project
environment. That structure could be project, matrix, orfunctional. The project
structure keeps people involved through the life of the project. It provides more
continuity and gives the project manager maximum control. The matrix organization
takes people from other projects/divisions within the organization to form a new team
that exists as long as needed to get the project done. The advantages of the matrix
organization are that it provides flexibility in staffing and the project manager does not
have to manage the same people too long. The disadvantages are that there could be
problems allocating resources and coordinating efforts among changing team members.
Another disadvantage is the employee could end up with two supervisors. In the
functional structure, each team is assigned one or more functional tasks (such as writing
the user interface) and each team has a specific structure. An advantage is that it is easier
to stay up to speed technically in a functional structure; the disadvantage is that it is
difficult to coordinate among multiple functions. Also, employees resist staying on the
project too long.
As described in [Ref. 2], there are three types of team structures:
- Democratic decentralized (DD): This team has no permanent leader. Decisions
are made by group consensus and communications are horizontal. People that work on
this type of team tend to have a high morale and high job satisfaction. This team is
communication intensive.
- Controlled decentralized (CD): This team has a defined leader who coordinates
specific tasks and has secondary leaders who have responsibility for subtasks. This team
is more structured than the DD.
- Controlled centralized (CC): a team leader manages top-level problem solving
and internal team coordination. This team is very structured.
The best team structure depends on project factors such as difficulty of the
problem, size of the program, team lifetime, degree to which the problem can be
modularized, required quality and reliability, rigidity of the delivery date, and degree of
communication required for the project. The DD structure is good for small (five people
or fewer) projects due to the time needed for a high level of communication. This
structure is also good for very difficult projects that may need more time for creative
ideas and problem solving to occur. The CD structure is good for larger projects that are
more modular, require high reliability, and have a shorter schedule to meet. The CC
structure is also good for larger, less difficult, highly modular projects. The CC structure
is desirable when there are strict time constraints.
Staffing the project. Staffing the project is extremely important. The people
selected to work on a project can make the project a success or a failure. It takes time to
evaluate applications and interview personnel. Certainly, it would be desirable to put all
the top software engineers together for the best possible team. However, that is not
always feasible. Each organization has junior people who need training and mentoring.
To put them all together on a software development project without senior technical staff
to help could be a disaster for the project. Ideally, the team would be a mixture ofnew,
inexperienced people and seasoned software developers. The developers with experience
can help and mentor the less experienced people on the team. Training should be
provided as needed.
Sometimes it might be difficult to attract the best people for the job. A project
manager is in competition with other projects within the organization for the best people.
Assuming the pay, benefits, and location are the same throughout the organization, one
way to attract the best people is to better yourself as a manager. [Ref. 2]
Another important aspect to consider after the team has been selected and staffed
is to make sure the manager/technical lead solves the personnel problems as they occur
without letting them hurt the project/team morale. For example, if the manager keeps a
poor performer on the team, eventually the other members will lose incentive to work and
it hurts the manager's reputation.
Selecting a software model/methodology. A methodology refers to the standards
and procedures that affect the planning, analysis, design, development, implementation,
operation, support, and disposal of a software-intensive system. The software life cycle
management methodologies include evolutionary, incremental, waterfall, spiral, or any
other tailored method applicable to the environment. A methodology should be chosen
based on the nature of the program, software domain, the methods and tools used, and the
controls and deliverables required. [Ref. 5]
Choosing an appropriate life cycle methodology is not always an easy task. Each
methodology has advantages and disadvantages. Current guidance for MIS development
is that the incremental or evolutionary methods constitute more effective risk
management and provide earlier satisfaction of user requirements.
The evolutionary life cycle is an alternative strategy for systems where future
requirement refinements are anticipated (i.e., the requirements evolve over time) or where
there is medium to high technical risk. This method involves building prototypes for the
user to test and refine the requirements. This is similar to the spiral model in that the
development process is iterative. This method is well-suited for high technology
software-intensive systems where requirements beyond the core capability can generally
be identified.
The incremental life cycle management method involves developing a
software-intensive product in a series of increments of increasing functional capability.
The requirements of the system are identified at the beginning of the project. Benefits of
this methodology are:
Risk is spread across several smaller increments instead of one large
development.
Requirements are stabilized during the production of a given increment.
Understanding the requirements for later increments becomes clearer based on
the user's ability to gain a working knowledge of earlier increments.
The incremental method is most appropriate for low-to medium-risk programs.
The waterfall model (also referred to as "Grand Design") was the first to
formalize a framework for software development phases, and placed emphasis on up-
front requirements and design activities and on producing documentation during early
phases. The major drawback is its inherent sequential nature. Any attempt to go back
two or more phases to correct a problem would result in major increases in cost and
schedule. It is not suited for modern development techniques such as prototyping and
automatic code generation. It also is not suited for unprecedented systems because it
inhibits flexibility.
The spiral method provides a risk-reducing approach to the software life cycle.
It combines basic waterfall building block and evolutionary/incremental prototype
approaches to software development. The building block activities include the
preliminary, detailed, and critical design reviews, code, unit test, integration and test, and
qualification test. The advantages of the spiral model are its emphasis on procedures,
such as risk analysis, and its adaptability to different life cycle approaches.
Selecting/defining the processes that will be used by the team. The project
manager should use processes to perform the major functions of software development
(planning, requirements analysis, software design, coding, unit testing, unit integration
and testing, configuration management, product evaluation, quality assurance). One of
the more formal approaches to processes is to implement policies and processes based on
an accepted model. Examples would be the CMM, and the ISO 9000 model. The models
can be tailored to be as formal or informal as the project manager desires.
Selecting tools to be used by the team. This is an important part of the planning
phase of the project. The tools refers to the hardware and software used by the team to
design, develop, debug, and document the software project, as well as perform
configuration management and maintenance functions. The tools selected need to be
functional, easily acquired, affordable, and easy to learn how to use.
III. WHY IS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT SO PROBLEMATIC?
In light of all the issues just described with software development, it comes as no
surprise that there are so many problems encountered when developing software. The
Department of the Air Force states in [Ref. 5] that overwhelming evidence indicates that
software programs fail for the following common reasons:
Software's inherent complexity. Software is risky because it is hard to build.
The complexity of hardware pales in comparison with the complexity of software.
Complexity plagues us because we often fail to take a disciplined approach to design and
create more complexity than needed. Software complexity should be kept to a minimum.
Highly complex solutions are destined to be high cost maintenance nightmares! The
more complex the software, the more difficult it is to understand and the greater the
chance for defects to propagate throughout the code. The cost of making changes and
correcting defects often soars beyond acceptable levels, resulting in programs being
abandoned after exorbitant expenditures of unrecoverable resources.
Our inability to estimate cost, schedule, and size. The fundamental reason
software-intensive development projects overrun cost and schedule, with resulting quality
and performance shortfalls, is our inability to estimate. No matter how smooth our
development process, how efficient our tools, or how smart our designers, our predictions
of cost and schedule are frequently out of sync with what actually occurs in the
production of a software product. We often forget that software development involves
much more than simply writing code. For example, we are still learning that software
maintenance consumes from 60% to 80% of our software dollars. We also do not
account for the amount of scrap or rework of code involved when a developer has an ad
hoc, chaotic development process, the cost ofwhich Boehm claims to be about 44% of
every dollar spent. Predicting the size and complexity of the software to be built is at the
heart of our estimation deficiencies. When a software development is precedented (i.e., a
similar system has been developed), size and complexity projections (and thus cost and
schedule) are usually more accurate. In unprecedented systems, however, our ability to
estimate the intangible is low.
Programs tend to get in trouble in small, progressively compounding increments.
When the product is late (and/or over cost), we apply management pressure to reduce the
slack between our projected delivery date and the illusive real one. This aggravates the
problem into a catch-22 situation. With inadequate resource and schedule estimates, the
time required to build-quality-in may be insufficient. To meet schedule and keep down
cost, the next easiest thing to cut is testing. Before we realize it, a late, over-cost program
evolves into an unreliable one. When a cost/schedule disaster is discovered, developers
often try to protect their contract through alternative proposals that attempt to deliver less
for the same price. This leads to down-scoping, or eliminating requirements, in an
attempt to stay within initial projections. This is a very serious situation because it means
resources have been expended, often exhausted, and the user does not get the system for
which they paid. There are many cases of programs that have been canceled without the
delivery of a single operational product after years of schedule and cost overruns.
There is also a problem with optimistic estimates. In DoD projects are subject to
spending and budgeting scrutiny, from the Congress, the press, and upper management.
Under pressure, contractors and military managers often make overly optimistic estimates
about how much the software will cost and how long it will take to produce. The
pessimistic cost, schedule, and size estimates are often discarded and our projections are
based on the best ofall possible worlds. Risk is not managed and a management reserve
or a worst-case scenario is not built into the cost and schedules for fear the program will
not get funded or approved if more realistic figures are submitted. This increases the
likelihood for shortcuts in the development of a product that was improperly funded and
scheduled.
Unstable Requirements. One big cause of software program failures, upon which
all the reports and studies undeniably concur, is requirements instability. It is reasonable
to expect that requirements of the software system are going to change because user
needs change, and when building weapon systems, the world and threats can change.
One way to prepare for the changes is to build software systems with an architecture that
tolerates changing requirements without compromising design. Another way to handle
the changes is to control how, and at what pace, inevitable requirements changes are
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incorporated. If ad hoc, sporadic, or frequent modifications to requirements or their
interpretation are inflicted on developers, changes in cost and schedule are a given.
Sometimes what appear to be minor changes have dramatic side effects elsewhere in the
software. If full (technical and effort) evaluation of change consequences are not
included in the management process, the incremental incorporation of changed
requirements can invalidate estimates of cost and schedule, diminishing product quality.
One potential source of instability is inadequately stated requirements. Indefinite
and undefined software requirements also lead to cost and schedule changes, which can
continue even after the program enters development. Requirements definition and
analysis is the most important task and is also very difficult for all sectors of industry and
government.
Misinterpretation of customer/user requirements is a major, if not the greatest,
contributor to software failure. Not understanding customer's needs and/or inadequately
stating requirements have often been the source of costly support problems and ultimate
program failures. It is critical to get customer/user feedback throughout the project to
determine whether perceived user needs have been correctly translated into software
functionality.
The main reason errors occur during requirements definition and analysis is lack
of communication. During the requirements phase, the user tries to articulate a concept
of the system functionality and performance required. The software engineer attempts to
translate user definitions into models of information, control flow, operational behavior,
and data content. The chances for misinterpretation are high.
Data collected at Rome Laboratory indicate that over 50% of all software errors
are "requirements errors." Requirements errors are more expensive to correct the further
they percolate throughout the life cycle.
Poor Problem Solving/Decision Making by Management. Management is, like
all other activities in software development, a problem-solving exercise. It involves
deciding what must be accomplished, how to do it, monitoring what is being performed,
and evaluating what has occurred. The "what" is expressed in the Software Development
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Plan. The "how" is an allocation of resources (people, lab facilities, computers, tools) to
get the job done within schedule and budget.
It's easy to forget that software development is dynamic and the original plans
and estimates must be updated as requirements change or people leave the project. When
change requests are submitted, it is a common mistake to fail to make a solid estimate of
their impact on the cost and schedule estimates. It is also a common mistake to fail to
demand additional payment for additional functionality, in an effort to please the
customer.
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT
A Formal Approach. The DoD established the SEI in 1 984 to advance the
practice of software engineering. The mission of the SEI is to provide leadership in
advancing the state of the practice of software engineering to improve the quality of
systems that depend on software. The mission of the SEI's Software Process Program is
to provide leadership in assisting software organizations to develop and continuously
improve their capability to identify, adopt, and use sound management and technical
practices. [Ref. 3]
The CMM for Software, developed by the SEI, is a framework that describes the
key elements of an effective software process and provides guidance on how to establish
and improve software development processes. The CMM describes an evolutionary
improvement path for software organizations from an ad hoc, immature process to a
mature, disciplined one. Five levels of maturity encompass this path. [Ref. 3]
The CMM presents recommended practices in a number ofKey Process Areas
(KPAs) that have been shown to enhance software development and maintenance
capability. When followed, these practices improve the ability of organizations to meet
goals for cost, schedule, functionality, and product quality. [Ref. 3]
The CMM contains the following KPAs in maturity levels two and three: [Ref. 6]
Requirements management is used to establish a common understanding
between the customer and the software project of the customer's requirements
that will be addressed by the software project.
software project planning is used to establish reasonable plans for performing
the software engineering and for managing the software project.
software project tracking and oversight is used to establish adequate visibility
into actual progress so that management can take effective actions when the
project deviates significantly from the plans.
software subcontract management is used to select qualified software
subcontractors and manage them effectively.
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software quality assurance is used to provide management with appropriate
visibility into the process being used by the software project and of the
products being built.
software configuration management is used to establish and maintain the
integrity of the products of the software project throughout the project's
software life cycle.
organization processfocus is used to establish the organizational
responsibility for software process activities that improve the organization's
overall software process capability.
organization process definition is used to develop and maintain a usable set of
software process assets that improve process performance across the projects
and provide a basis for cumulative, long-term benefits to the organization.
trainingprogram is used to develop the skills and knowledge of individuals so
they can perform their roles effectively and efficiently.
integrated software management is used to integrate the software engineering
and management activities into a coherent, defined software process that is
tailored from the organization's standard software process and related process
assets, which are described in Organization Process Definition. This tailoring
is based on the business environment and technical needs of the project.
- software product engineering is used to consistently perform a well-defined
engineering process that integrates all the software engineering activities to
produce correct, consistent software products effectively and efficiently.
intergroup coordination is used to establish a means for the software
engineering group to participate actively with the other engineering groups so
the project is better able to satisfy the customer's needs effectively and
efficiently.
- peer reviews is used to remove defects from the software work products early
and efficiently.
Correlation between project success and using the CMM was established in a
study done by the Air Force Institute of Technology in September 1995. An excerpt from
14
their report says, "The aim of our research was to determine the nature of a correlation
between the CMM rating and software development success. We were able to show
correlation between CMM rating and the cost and schedule performance.... We observed
improved cost and schedule performance with increasing process maturity. Specifically,
the least mature organizations were likely to have difficulty adhering to cost and schedule
baselines...the more mature organizations were likely to have on-baseline cost and
schedule performance. This study has validated a correlation between project success and
CMM ratings...". [Ref. 7]
According to SEI, all of the military services have used ad hoc practices that have
resulted in unpredictable costs and schedules and low-quality software products that do
not meet users' needs. To address these problems, the services have taken different
approaches to improving software development and test and evaluation and are in various
stages of implementing those improvements. [Ref. 1]
An Informal Approach. The most publicized software development failures are
usually large projects either in military or industry. Less conspicuous are the far more
numerous smaller projects that take too long, cost too much, and deliver crummy stuff.
[Ref. 8] Dr. James Emery has been closely involved in a number of successful
development projects. They all followed a similar approach to a process called Rapid
Application Development (RAD): a small team, working about a year in a relatively
informal environment, delivered a successful system that matched or exceeded
management expectations. Although large projects need highly disciplined processes,
this approach seems to work well for small to medium projects. [Ref 8, 9]
The RAD process has three essential ingredients:
an adaptive methodology that can take advantage of the organizational
learning that takes place during the development process
a productive set ofdevelopment tools that makes it feasible to respond quickly
to user feedback
a small team ofhighly competent developers
These ingredients were also described in the Introduction of this thesis and in
[Ref. 4]. The basic idea of an adaptive methodology is to proceed through an iterative
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process of design that eventually converges to an acceptable design. Each iteration is a
working prototype. This prototype enables maximum communication between users and
developers. It is much easier to comprehend how the system will work if you have a
prototype to test as opposed to a design document to read. Eventually the evolving
prototype becomes functional and robust enough to deploy as a production system. Once
in production, revisions occur at a much slower pace. Initial planning of the tasks
involved and the data model to be used is an important part of the adaptive process and
will contribute greatly to the success of the project.
A set ofproductive development tools is the second ingredient to this approach to
software development. The tools must allow for a seamless migration through a series of
prototypes to the eventual production system. Depending on the project environment, the
tool set would consist of several complementary tools. Tools needed could include ones
used to do project scheduling and planning, writing reports, generating forms,
maintaining a database, and project accounting.
A small team ofhighly talented developers is the third ingredient to this approach.
If the project is small enough, most of the management and coordination overhead
required on a large project can be avoided. Communication is not limited by hierarchical
reporting relationships. Each member is encouraged to contribute his or her ideas in open
dialogues. This type of team was described earlier in section two of this thesis. The high
level of communication and opportunity for creativity are two of the greatest strengths of
a small team.
The Tradeoffs. Some of the drawbacks to implementing the formal approach to
software development and software process improvement are described in the SmartNet
case study found later in the thesis. It takes a lot of time and money to develop/tailor the
organizational processes to be used by the projects and to train the employees on how to
use these processes. Depending on the culture of the organization, getting management
and the employees to "buy-in" to this process may or may not be easy. It also takes time
(sometimes two to three years) to see the benefits of SPI activities. However, when faced
with managing and organizing a large software development project, the formal processes
provide management control over the development process and help guarantee a reliable,
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high quality system, delivered on time. One way for new projects to realize cost savings
is to leverage off of the lessons learned from projects that have more experience with SPI
efforts.
The informal RAD approach is not appropriate for large projects or projects where
program reliability and maintainability (or lack of it) can endanger lives (such as in
military weapons systems). A formal approach is needed in these instances. However,
the RAD approach has certainly been successful on numerous small projects.
The initial costs of implementing a RAD approach would be in software/hardware
tools versus costs of implementing processes and training employees in the formal
approach.
An adaptive development process conflicts with the school of software engineers
who prize well-defined up-front requirements and a disciplined, reproducible
implementation process. They would no doubt find the adaptive development process
undisciplined and sloppy, seriously lacking according to CMM criteria. With an adaptive
process, one does not know up front exactly what the end result will be; instead, one
arrives at the end result through a process of organizational learning and discovery. It is
an uncertain and ambiguous venture. [Ref. 8]
The adaptive development process approach is one way to plan for the changes in
requirements that will inevitably occur during the development of a software system. The
CMM attempts to plan for requirements changes by implementing a requirements




V. CAN PROCESSES SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT?
In this section I will look at how both the formal and informal processes described
earlier can help solve the problems encountered on software development projects.
As mentioned previously in Section III of this thesis, the main problems occurring
in software development projects are due to:
program complexity
ability to estimate cost, schedule, and size
unstable requirements
poor problem solving/decision making by management
Problems can also occur during the planning and staffing phases of the software project
as described in Section II of this thesis.
Table 1 lists the problems that can occur during the development of a software
project and the process that was designed to help solve the problem for both the formal
and informal approach to software development.
The CMM key process areas that are listed in Table 1 were described earlier in
Section II of the thesis. The informal approach to software development discussed
earlier, RAD, attempts to solve the problems of software complexity and unstable
requirements by implementing an adaptive methodology. This methodology uses
prototypes to develop the requirements and keep a high level of communication between
the developer and the users. Since it is expected that the requirements will change, this
process plans for these changes.
The RAD approach uses productive development tools to help solve the problems
of estimating cost and schedule of the program. Time boxing refers to the practice of
setting a time limit on an activity and using what you have developed so far when the
time limit arrives. The tools can also aid in communication, which in the long run,
enables better problem solving and decision making. Since this approach would be used
on small to medium projects, a lot of the management problems would be eliminated due
to the size of the project team.
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Regardless of the methodology followed for software development, there will
always be problems because industry and government are never satisfied with their













Ability to estimate cost,






























Table 1 . Processes Designed to Solve Software Development Problems
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VI. SOFTWARE PROCESS IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS IN INDUSTRY
The two companies I chose to describe in this section are both successful and
leaders in their area of expertise. One company uses a formal approach to software
development and the other has, in the past, used a very informal approach to software
development.
In July 1996, The Defense & Space Group, Boeing Space Transportation Systems
(STS), achieved a Level 5 rating using the SEI CMM. This rating was the result found
when a CMM-Based Appraisal for Internal Process Improvement (CBA 1PI) was
performed. This assessment took 10 days and required that evidence of
institutionalization be provided for all software development activities. This significant
achievement illustrates how customer interest has shifted from the technology focus of
the 1960s and 1970s to the cost & schedule focus of the 1980s and finally to a process
focus in the 1990s. Because the STS made process improvement a high priority, it
demonstrated a high level of maturity in a formal assessment. [Ref. 10]
As stated in [Ref. 11], Boeing feels the most tremendous benefit of high-maturity
processes has been the Air Force's satisfaction and confidence in their organization - not
because of their CMM rating, but because of the high quality of their product and
predictable cost and schedule. The Air Force is Boeing's major customer.
Another unexpected benefit of reaching a Level 5 was revealed when STS
responded to an Air Force Software Development Capability Evaluation (SDCE) as part
of a proposal preparation. Having CMM-based processes in place made it easier to
respond to the difficult questions, and documentation supporting STS's claims was
readily available for inclusion into the responses. [Ref. 11]
The practices used by Boeing's STS organization are described here briefly and in
detail in [Ref. 12]. An internal Software Engineering Process Group (SEPG) managed
the organizational processes. Processes were updated as needed, training was developed
and implemented, and emphasis was placed on a standard software development process.
The metrics developed and reported included defect rates, training effectiveness, defect
probability and other trend measures. Inspections were performed often since Boeing
thinks that inspections are the single most effective method of reducing defects. In their
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application, defects were reduced by 85%. Cycle time was reduced up to 50% and
productivity was increased by 240%. The cost-to-benefit ratio of 1 :7 was realized along
with cost underruns. With numbers such as these, it is clear that the CMM has helped
Boeing STS to become successful in many ways.
In contrast, Microsoft, also a highly successful organization, has had a different
approach to software development, which I will describe briefly here. Their approach is
described in detail in [Ref. 13].
In the early days of Microsoft, the development process was more informal and
there was less emphasis on schedule methodology and software architecture. Perhaps
because of their lack of formal training, most of these developers did not follow the
highly structured software development methodologies created by DoD and large
corporate MIS departments. They often developed software without a formal
specification or design.
Microsoft relied heavily on individual superstars to develop software. Although
this strategy worked well for them for awhile, they also encountered many problems, e.g.,
the superstars were hard to find; the people who were hired to maintain the code written
by the superstars had difficulty understanding their code; the superstars did not always
understand what the market wanted; and if too many of them were put together on a team,
design decisions became a real problem. They did not always work well together.
Because Microsoft was criticized in the mid-1 980's for writing software which
was technically excellent but difficult to understand and hard to use, Bill Gates began to
hire marketing specialists to reorient Microsoft to focus on the customer. They also
introduced a program management function to formalize design, coordinate product
creation functions (development, testing, and user education), and perform support
functions such as manual reviews, and competitive product evaluation. Teams of about a
dozen software developers for each major project were established. Other major
competitors of the time used much larger teams (often 100 or more). It is interesting to
note that Microsoft's cost per line of code developed was significantly lower than the
industry average, which was about $125 in 1989.
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While Microsoft had become somewhat more formalized, the basic truth was that
the developers still had ultimate control of the process and the code. The company had a
deep underlying philosophy that people know what they are doing and will try to do the
right thing.
In 1984, a team of highly experienced developers was established to develop
Word for Windows. The project was scheduled for completion by October 1985. They
had numerous problems and in July 1986, the project manager left the project. A new
team was formed. They ended up throwing away everything that had been done for the
last year and started over. They were a year behind schedule from the start. The new
team was almost entirely staffed with new hires. Because this new team was under heavy
pressure to deliver a system, they tended to do the minimum amount of work necessary
on a feature. The end result was that the testing and debugging phase took much longer
than expected. Staffing of the project changed due to illness/burnout of employees.
Word for Windows was finally released on November 30, 1989.
In order to learn from the mistakes of previous projects, Microsoft had instituted a
policy of reviewing every project upon its completion. Statistics were collected into a
document along with minutes of meetings held during the project. This document (called
the postmortem) was distributed to all managers in the business group and to senior
managers. The postmortem for this project was four times larger than the average project
postmortem. While [Ref. 10] does not describe what Microsoft actually did as a result of
the postmortem, it does describe some of the ideas for improving product development
that were discussed in the postmortem. The majority of developers enjoyed the informal
approach to software development, however, some felt that a more structured
development process would substantially improve the company's development
performance. This would include relying on more formal project phases and strict
milestones, as well as the implementation of formal structured methodologies for
software development. Others felt the cause of Microsoft's problems was in its approach
to project management. The current approach lacked focus and control. The developers
felt that the program managers simply did not have the level of technical knowledge
required to really understand a software development project. Other managers thought
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the lack of a uniform strategy at the business level was the fundamental problem. They
focused on the need for coherence across similar applications.
It is interesting to see that the problems and successes in industry are similar to
the problems and successes experienced in government. The rest of the thesis focuses on
the SPI efforts at SSC-SD and, in particular, one project at SSC-SD.
24
VII. SOFTWARE PROCESS IMPROVEMENT EFFORT AT SSC-SD
Software is a major part ofmany systems that SSC-SD acquires, develops, or
maintains. Consistent management and engineering processes must be applied to the
acquisition, development, and maintenance of software to identify and control the risks
associated with software-intensive systems. In the current environment of rapidly
changing technology and competition, the SSC-SD software engineering mission is to
keep competitive by being a DoD leader in developing and acquiring quality software-
intensive systems. [Ref. 14]
The Software Engineering Process Office (SEPO) was established as a result of an
SEI assessment in 1988 and was tasked to assist the SSC-SD software community in
identifying, documenting, institutionalizing, and improving the processes they use to
develop and maintain their software products. As projects improve their processes, it is
expected that the government will save dollars on contracts and in-house labor which is
necessary in this time of shrinking budgets and downsizing edicts. The government
contractors, on the other hand, can expect to see an increase in productivity which will
give them a more competitive edge in bidding for contracts and the company's capacity
to do work will increase thereby increasing profits. SEPO has been developing policies
and processes for project managers to use as well as providing in-house training. The SPI
effort at SSC-SD uses CMM as a guide for improving organizations' software
engineering process. The rest of the thesis describes the costs and benefits of the SPI
activities implemented on an SSC-SD project called SmartNet.
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VIII. DESCRIPTION OF THE SMARTNET PROJECT
SmartNet is a project that has been working to improve its software development
processes for the last three years. Prior to December 1994, several years were spent by
the project manager doing the necessary research in high performance and distributed
computing needed to get SmartNet started. In December 1994, SAIC joined the team and
started implementing SPI activities. It is fielded to several users. The technical team
currently fixes problems, adds enhancements as approved, and distributes new software
releases periodically. The latest software version contains 92,345 lines of code. This
paper will describe the processes they have chosen to implement and the costs and
benefits associated with the activities performed. This section describes the project and a
little bit about the history and the people working on it.
SmartNet is a scheduling tool for distributed High Performance Computing
(HPC). SmartNet's goals are to:
- Maximize computing power
- Increase throughput
- Optimize cost-effectiveness
- Leverage existing resources
- Ensure robust scheduling
SmartNet provides an HPC scheduling framework for near-optimal and
simultaneous employment of up to hundreds of resources (heterogeneous and
homogeneous, local and remote) for thousands of tasks (heterogeneous and
homogeneous). Performance improvement of over one order of magnitude decrease in
computing time with existing tasks on existing resources has been achieved and
documented.
SmartNet determines scheduling decisions by matching compute characteristics
(code/algorithms and data) to resources (processors and networks) which are collectively
called a Virtual Heterogeneous Machine (VHM). [Ref. 15]
SmartNet can be beneficial to any system that uses multiple resources. It has to
be integrated into current systems. Some of the current users of SmartNet are listed and
their applications described in this paragraph. NASA Earth Observation System (EOS) at
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Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland extracts data from satellites and they use
SmartNet to plan what processes go to what computers. The National Institute of Health
(NTH) wants to use resources after hours. SmartNet has helped them to distribute jobs.
Joint Task Force Advanced Technology Demonstration (JTF ATD) project has integrated
SmartNet with its model server for the Pacific Disaster Center. They run simulated
disaster models and SmartNet will act as a scheduling advisor within different sites.
Florida State University, National Security Agency (NSA), Navy Simulation Systems
(NSS), and the USS Coronado are among the numerous test and evaluation users.
The Heterogeneous Computing Team (HCT), led by Richard Freund, consists of
SSC-SD personnel in Code D4223, SAIC personnel, consultants, and academia from
Naval Post Graduate School, George Mason University (GMU), University of Cincinnati,
and Purdue. The SmartNet product is developed at SSC-SD and is funded by Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) Information System Office (ISO), Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Space Integration (DUSD (SI)), NASA EOS, NSA, High
Performance Computing Modernization Office (HPCMO), and Space and Naval Warfare
Command Center (SPAWAR).
The team consists of twelve full-time and seven part-time people plus various
academic collaborators. They have three full-time and two part-time managers; eight
full-time and two part-time people that perform research, programming and engineering
support; one full-time and one part-time administrative assistant; and two part-time
consultants.
Richard Freund, the project manager, has stated that his software process
improvement goals and project goals are inter-related. They are:
- To achieve a CMM maturity level 3
- To produce a high quality product with high reliability while maintaining a high
level of control in configuration management.
- To successfully market the SmartNet product
In order to develop and maintain a high quality product that is highly reliable and
controlled, they must have processes in place and in practice to consistently achieve this
goal. These factors are mandatory to successfully market SmartNet. This project was
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evaluated by an internal SAIC Common Approach Based Appraisal (CBA) Internal
Process Improvement (IPI) assessment team and was found to satisfy all activities of a
CMM level 3 project. SmartNet draws on both SSC-SD Program Management and SAIC
Management and process improvement activities defined and implemented by SAIC to
satisfy the organizational support requirements for that level. Since the processes used on
SmartNet are SAIC processes (versus SSC-SD processes developed by the SEPO office),
the "organizational" requirement/definition was not met. If SmartNet were to implement
SSC-SD SPI processes, they could be re-evaluated for a level 3. A formal independent
evaluation is planned in the fall of 1998; SmartNet was going to be one of the projects
appraised at that time. Unfortunately, the project manager is leaving SSC-SD and the
project is coming to an end in December 1997.
SAIC's SPI goals are to achieve a CMM maturity level 3 in order to increase
quality and quantity ofwork performed as well as continue to be competitive for
government contracts. They achieved their goal.
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IX. SPI ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED ON SMARTNET
According to the SmartNet configuration manager, all SEI-CMM level 2 and 3
KPAs are addressed on the SmartNet project. All SEI-CMM level 2 and 3 activities are
defined and practiced in an effort to solve the problems discussed earlier in the thesis.
The basis for the processes used by SAJC is described in several volumes of a document
called Common Approach to Software Development and Maintenance. This document is
described below.
Volume 1 . Policy and Processes contains the following sections:
- Software Development and Maintenance Policy
- Software Development and Maintenance Process
- Software Management Process
- Software Review Process
- Software Test Process
- Software Quality Assurance Process
- Software Configuration Management Process
Volume II. SEI CMM Compliance Matrix
Volume III. Implementation and Tailoring Matrices
Volume IV. Sample Forms, Checklists and References
Volume V. SAIC Metrics Handbook and Collection Guide
- SAIC Handbookfor Software Measurement Reporting Formats
Volume VI. Training Program Definitions and Guidance.
SAIC also has a Quality Program, a Software Training Program and a Measurement
Program. Employees are required to learn and practice the methods described in the
Common Approach.
The SmartNet team has implemented an Oracle database to track and store their
Software Change Requests. They keep metrics on the actions taken by the Software
Configuration Control Board (SCCB) in this database. Reports are generated from this
database and are included as Appendices to this document. They also keep hardcopy
files of SCRs. These files and the database are checked/audited every three months for
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accuracy. CVS is used for version control. They are currently in the process of
automating their processes. The following paragraphs describe the reports.
The SmartNet - Software Change Request is filled in on-line by users/testers of
SmartNet whenever a problem has been found or an enhancement has been identified.
There are fields identified to store the following information: type of SCR, date of SCR,
status, priority, deadline, level of effort expected, software lines of code (SLOC) affected,
where the problem was found (design review/code review), the assignee, name of
submitter and email address, version of software, tests run, and description of the
problem/enhancement. When the SCCB meets, the new SCRs are discussed and action is
assigned and noted on the SCR. A copy of this report is found in Appendix A.
The Actual vs. Estimated Level ofEffort (LOE) Report is used to track the amount
of time estimated to fix the change and the actual amount of time it took to fix the
change. It can be sorted by SCR number or by assignee. This report covers SCRs and
Action Items (AI). The difference between the estimated LOE and the actual LOE is
calculated and written on the report. If the difference is a positive number, the assignee
fixed the problem faster than expected. If the difference is a negative number, the
assignee spent more time than expected fixing the SCR. On the report sorted by assignee,
a summary is provided for each assignee of the average time spent by the assignee on
each SCR and a summation of the total number of hours spent fixing the SCRs assigned
to them. The summary also includes a summation of the estimated minus the actual
hours to fix the SCRs and an average of that number over all the SCRs. On the report
sorted by SCR number, a summary is also provided at the end of the report. The
summary includes the total number of hours estimated and actually spent fixing all the
SCRs in the system and the difference between the two. The average of the actual,
estimated and difference is also calculated. A copy of this report is found in Appendix B.
The Closed AIs/SCRs Report can also be sorted by SCR number or by assignee.
This report lists each SCR and Al along with the deadline for fixing the SCR or
completing the AI. The actual LOE is also listed on the report. On the report sorted by
assignee, a summary is provided for each assignee of the total number of hours spent
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fixing SCRs/AIs and the average number of hours spent. A copy of this report is found in
Appendix C.
The SCRs/AIs Closed Between <start date> and <end date> lists all the
SCRs/AIs that were closed within the dates specified in the starting date and ending date
(i.e., SCRs/AIs closed between 01-Mar -1997 and 05-Sep-1997). The SCRs are sorted
by date closed. This report can also be generated for SCRs/AIs opened between specified
dates. A copy of this report is in Appendix D.
The Team Power Report gives a level of effort analysis and current status of each
open SCR/AI. This report is reviewed each week at the Configuration Control Board
meeting and provides the project manager with a summary ofwhat the team is working
on. The report is sorted by assignee. It lists each SCR/AI assigned to the engineer, the
due date of the SCR/AI (Ql through Q4 for which quarter of the year), and the
Percentage of Effort (POE) set by the task leader. It also lists the priority of the SCR/AI
(normal, normal+, urgent), the percent done, the estimated level of effort (LOE), the
current LOE, and the adjusted LOE. A rule of thumb used to determine the percent of
work done is described below:
the first 25% of the software developers time will be spent defining
requirements
the second 25% of the work is designing the change
the third 25% is coding the change
the last 25% is testing the change
So, if the software developer was currently in the process of coding the change, it would
be estimated that the percent done is 50%. The estimated level of effort is the number of
hours expected to be spent fixing the SCR/AI. The current LOE is the cumulative
number of hours actually performed. The adjusted LOE is the number of hours expected
to be spent based on percentage done and the current LOE. For each assignee, a
summary is provided that lists the hours remaining, the total LOE, the LOE balance, and
the adjusted LOE balance. The hours remaining is the amount of hours left to fix the
SCR; it is the difference between the due date of the SCR and the current date. The total
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LOE is the sum of the LOE of all SCRs/Als assigned to each person. The LOE balance is
calculated by the formula
hours remaining * POE - estimated LOE.
The adjusted LOE balance takes into account the percentage done. A copy of this report
is found in Appendix E.
The SCR Metricsfor Problem SCRs contains several "mini reports" based on
metrics entered into the database. One report is called SCR Average Age Report. The
data in these report covers a specific time frame (in days) entered by the operator. It lists
all SCRs opened as of the end of each month specified by the time frame entered, and
identifies how many of those SCRs have a critical/urgent priority. The data in this report
is skewed due to the fact that low priority SCRs with a due date of several months or
years away are included in the data along with high priority SCRs with early due dates.
Another report is the SCR Open Activity Report. This report lists the number of SCRs
that have a priority of critical, urgent, normal, and low as of the end of each month
specified by the time frame entered. The SCR Open/Close Rate Report lists the number
of SCRs opened and closed at the end of each month specified by the time frame entered.
The SCR Total Open Report lists the number of all SCRs opened as of the end of each
month specified by the time frame entered. This report also lists the number of
critical/urgent SCRs. Another set of these "mini reports" can be generated for SCR
problems and enhancements. This report is called the SCR Metricsfor Problem and
Enhancement SCRs. These reports are found in Appendix F.
The SmartNet team has implemented a "Home Team Page" on the web to
communicate among all of the developers and consultants and exchange technical ideas
as well as meeting information. They call this "Newsgroup" discussion.
Each release of a new software build requires 2-4 weeks of testing prior to release
to the customers. The developers usually write the tests while others, less familiar with
SmartNet, actually run the tests. SCRs are written by the test team and fixed by the
developers. The documentation is also updated to reflect the software changes
implemented.
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Each build is documented in a Version Description Document (VDD) that lists the
lockdown and release dates, the status of each SCR included in this version, the
requirements for the version and the lower priority fixes included. This information is
stored in a repository. An example of the VDD is in Appendix G.
SAIC provided training for its employees. The costs of this training are discussed
in the next section. Classes taken are:
- Common Approach Orientation (3 hours)
- Software Project Management (24 hours)
- Requirements Management (24 hours)
- Configuration Management (8 hours)
- Introduction to Software Quality Assurance Course ( 4 hours)
- Software Quality Assurance for Practitioners (16 hours)
- Estimation (4 hours)
- Peer Reviews (8 hours)
- Testing (8 hours)
- Engineering Principles (8 hours)
- Metrics (8 hours)
- Process Group Operations (4 hours)
- Common Approach Based Appraisal-Internal Process Improvement (CBA-IPI)
(30 hours)
SSC-SD also provided training for their employees on the SmartNet team. Some
of the classes taken were:
- Software Project Management Course (40 hours)
- Grammar Brush-up for Writers (8 hours)
- Contemporary Navy Writing (16 hours)
- Giving Technical Presentations ( 1 6 hours)
- Effective Leadership for Women (8 hours)
One of the activities the SmartNet team implemented is the peer review. They
have three types of peer reviews: formal design reviews, formal code reviews, and
informal one-to-one reviews. The majority of the reviews done on SmartNet were design
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reviews. As ofDecember 1996, the team had only done a few code reviews. The design
reviews are the time to focus on clarifying the requirements, discussing design issues and
planning the design of the project. They did not keep records of defects found in design
reviews because the purpose of the design review was to work out differences or
misconceptions, not to generate Software Change Requests. The work surrounding the
review topic was covered under an already open SCR (since they address bugs and
enhancements under the same tracking system). They do keep track of "where" a defect
is found in the SCR database, but that information is used mostly during the test phase.
They do not keep track of defects found in the informal one-to-one review.
The software development team uses a Software Detailed Design Review form
and a checklist to help analyze proposed design changes. A review panel consisting of
the Software Manager, the Systems Engineer, and other software developers/engineers on
the team discuss the design changes. At the design review meeting, the assignee must
present his/her design and implementation plan. Each engineer who attends the design
review must fill out the design review checklist. The software manager fills out the
design review form indicating acceptance or rejection of the design change. If the
change is accepted, the assignee must submit a thoroughly documented design in paper.
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X. ANALYSIS OF COSTS OF SPI ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED
The tangible costs of implementing and maintaining SPI activities are evidenced
in time spent. Table 2 is a summary of estimated time spent in this effort. The time
included:
training





managing SCRs requirements management
tracking time spent
reporting
unit and/or component test
managing the source code itself
periodic reviews
It is impossible to quantitatively compare these efforts to the activities that existed prior
to the implementation of formal process (e.g., planning, mitigating risk, addressing
quality issues, evaluating/improving productivity, and reviewing the product) because
there are no metrics on the former informal processes used by the SmartNet team. No
software costs for the ORACLE database are included because SSC-SD already had
purchased the software.
The training costs for SAIC includes learning about CMM, how to implement
CMM activities, and how to assess the maturity level of projects. The cost of designing
and giving the courses is not included in this estimate since SAIC gives these classes to
employees on all projects within the organization, not just SmartNet. The costs include
labor hours spent in training. The dollar figure was derived from the number of class
hours multiplied by the number of attendees multiplied by hourly rate. The hourly rate
varies for each category of labor. The categories on SmartNet are project managers,
project leads/senior engineers, and software engineers.
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SSC-SD also provides training for its employees. The specific classes are listed
in the previous section of this thesis. The total costs were derived from the number of
people attending the class multiplied by the number of hours plus the tuition costs for
each student.
An intangible cost described by SAIC personnel working on SmartNet is the time
and effort expended to change the culture of the organization. The people on the project
did not want to become involved with the SPI efforts and, as a consequence, were
"fighting" the system. The employees wasted time as a result of attitudes against SPI.
The solution they found was to make the SPI policies flexible enough so that the
practitioners could use them. It is interesting to note that according to one employee, the
same people who were resistant to implementing SPI activities in the beginning would
not want to work on a project that didn't practice SPI now.
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$ 14,432 $ 14,432
Total $209,226 $107,766 $316,992
Table 2. Summary of Costs Incurred Implementing SPI Activities
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XI. ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS OF SPI ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED
The SmartNet project manager, Richard Freund, believes that it takes two to three
years to see the benefits of SPI efforts. The SPI activities on this project started three
years ago. One of the benefits he has seen is that he has better management control over
his program. The mechanisms that the team has in place to accomplish this are: the
informal design/peer reviews, the website "Newsgroup", the maintenance of the
SmartNet database, the generation of reports that give the status of the software
development effort, and the weekly SCCB meetings. With better management control,
Richard has more time to market SmartNet and build business.
As described by the software development team, some of the tangible software
quality improvements on this project are fewer system failures, better overall
performance, and delivery of software builds closer to schedule. Table 3 lists the data
available on their software delivery schedules.
The team also thinks that the software design is well documented and understood
by the developers. This enables developers to fix SCRs or add enhancements with less
effort required than in the beginning of the project when the software design was not as
well documented. Figure 1 shows the estimated and actual LOE expended on SCRs for
the project. The difference between the estimated and actual LOE is calculated by
subtracting the actual LOE from the estimated LOE. The result is included in Figure 1
.
In most cases, the actual LOE exceeded the estimated LOE. This fact adds testimony to
the difficulty of estimating software development even with SPI processes in place. The
peaks of activity on this project occurred in preparation of the release of versions 2.1-
beta, 2.5, and 2.7 of the software. Version 2.1 -beta was the first documented software
build released on 15 February 1995. Their SPI effort started in December 1994. Version
2.5 was released on 5 February 1996. According to the reports generated from the
database, the previous version (v2.3) was released almost 9 months prior to v2.5. So, it
seems reasonable to expect the most amount of activity happened during the longest time
between software versions. The average length of time between software versions was
3.86 months. The third peak of activity occurred in preparation for release of version 2.7
in October 1996. Figure 2 shows the estimated costs associated with the actual LOE
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expended fixing SCRs. This was calculated by multiplying the LOE and the current rate
of a software engineer.




Version 2.1 -beta 15 February 1995
Version 2.1 21 February 1995
Version 2.2a 4 May 1995
Version 2.3 25 May 1995
Version 2.5 5 February 1996
Version 2.6 29 March 1996 22 April 1996
Version 2.7 01 October 1996 10 October 1996
Version 2.7.2 05 March 1997 05 March 1997
Version 3.0 01 October 1997 Still unreleased
Table 3. SmartNet Software Release Dates
Figure 3 shows the number of SCRs closed and opened for each version of
software released. The data used for this chart is found in Appendix F. This chart also
shows the number of critical and urgent priority SCRs opened during the time frame in
between each software version. The highest number of SCRs opened and closed occurs
at the same time version 2.5 is released. As mentioned previously, the length of time
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between version 2.3 and version 2.5 was more than twice as long as the average time
between versions, so a higher number of SCRs would not be a surprise. The number of
SCRs opened and closed continues to diminish for the subsequent software versions even
though the time in between versions is longer than average.
According to the project management team, some of the intangible benefits are
customer satisfaction due to delivering a higher quality product that is built to customer
specification, providing up-to-date user documentation, and conducting effective (crash
free) demonstrations. The number of SCRs written has diminished by approximately
45% over the last year and a half, which could indicate that SmartNet software is of
higher quality than in years past.
Another indicator of higher quality is illustrated in Table 4. It shows the
estimated vs. actual SCRs written along with the reduction in defect rates experienced by
this project. According to [Ref. 16], many SPI methods reduce the number of defects
induced into a product, thus reducing rework costs. Defect rates are measured in terms of
"Average Defects per KSLOC." Several sources quoted in [Ref. 16] have shown that 7
defects per KSLOC is a typical defect rate throughout the development process for new
code. Estimated SCRs is calculated by multiplying 7 times the KLOC. As evidenced in
Table 4, SmartNet' s defect rate is much lower. SAIC provided the SLOC for versions
2.7.2 and 3.0. I used the same SLOC as version 2.7.2 for all other versions of software.
Since most SCRs were found and written during the testing phase for each version, a
possible conclusion is that the reduction in defect rates is the result of informal peer
reviews and design reviews.
The SAIC employees are not working the amount of overtime they did in the
beginning of the project. However, according to the software manager, although some of
the peaks of overtime have disappeared since they started doing better process
management, the overall amount of overtime has probably stayed level because the
amount ofwork they attempt to do seems to expand to fit the time available. Other
benefits are that the team is better educated due to extensive training offered at SAIC and
SSC-SD. The people on the project are more accountable for their work and feel a sense
of responsibility to make sure their work is done well. The employee morale is also
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higher. This can be evidenced in the fact the members of the team participate in meetings
by providing ideas for improving their product technically and ideas on improving
marketing efforts. Communication is better between team members. They seem to have
better attitudes and would not want to work on projects that did not have SPI activities
implemented.
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Number of SCRs Fixed
Figure 1. SmartNet SCR Level of Effort
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V2.1 beta 93.603 655 85 87% 85 87%
V2.1 93.603 655 5 99% 90 86%
V2.2a 93.603 655 83 87% . 173 74%
V2.3 93.603 655 39 94% 212 68%
V2.5 93.603 655 178 73% 390 41%
V2.6 93.603 655 49 93% 439 33%
V2.7 93.603 655 82 87% 521 20%
V2.7.2 93.603 655 38 94% 559 15%
V3.0 85.951 601 33 95% 592 2%
Table 4. Defect Rates of SmartNet Software Versions
48
XII. CONCLUSIONS
According to the SmartNet Project Manager and a few members of the
development team, the SPI activities that resulted in the most benefits are in the KPA of
Project Tracking and Oversight. The project manager and software manager have more
insight into the status of the software development effort, and therefore can make better
decisions. The SmartNet team repeatedly praised the process used to track SCRs as an
effective and efficient process. This was noted at the CBA-IPI conducted in May 1996.
The reports generated from this SCR database provide the knowledge needed by
management to better control the project and make sound business decisions.
To summarize, the primary costs of implementing SPI activities on SmartNet
were the costs to train the employees; setup and maintain the SCR database; and
participate in SPI activities, including SCCB meetings, risk assessment meetings, quality
assurance audits, requirements management, keeping metrics, reporting, testing, and
periodic reviews.
The benefits resulting from their efforts are:
- Better management control over the project
- Better overall performance of the software
- Better documentation
- Software delivery closer to scheduled date
- Higher quality software
- Higher customer satisfaction
- Improved employee morale
- Better communication among the team
- Less overtime required to get the job done
- Employees better educated
- Increased employee pride in their work and increased responsibility and
accountability for their work.
In comparison, the benefits received from the efforts made on SmartNet are
similar to what was documented in A Business Casefor Software Process Improvement.
[Ref. 1 6] One report sited states the many non-measurable benefits from a SPI program
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include improved morale by the developers, increased respect for software from
organizations external to software and less required overtime. Other benefits from SPI
described in this report are that companies feel they are more competitive, improved
customer satisfaction, and more repeat business from their customers. Another report
claims that the first benefit resulting from SPI is the ability to meet schedule. Based on
Raytheon's SPI effort, benefits are that employees feel the company wants them to do a
good job, higher employee morale, less absenteeism, lower attrition rates, and fewer
nights and weekends required by employees. Most of these secondary benefits are hard
to quantify and hard to measure. It is encouraging that SmartNet experienced the same
benefits as other companies and projects that have implemented SPI activities.
As documented in [Ref. 17], the benefit most frequently noted by the research
participants concerned attitudinal changes. The morale and confidence of the developers
improved significantly. Participants also attributed less overtime, less employee
turnover, improved competitive advantage, and increased cooperation between functional
groups as benefits resulting from process improvement initiatives. SmartNet experienced
the same benefits.
In summary, this thesis has discussed the issues and problems involved in
software development and described both a formal and an informal approach to solving
the problems inherent in software development. The discussions of SPI efforts in
industry and government and the case study give additional credence to the idea that a
well-defined process (whether formal or informal) will help any software development
project to succeed.
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APPENDIX A. SOFTWARE CHANGE REQUEST
SCR# 1063 SmartNet - Software Change Request
SCR# 1063
Title: SNAP time clock runs slow in LIVE mode
Type: PROBLEM Post-Mortem: N Submit Date: 18-0CT-1996
Status Priority Deadline LOE SLOC DR CR Assignee
CLOSED URGENT Q3T-1996 5 Bill Adsit
SCCB Action:
Resolution:







This problem showed up on ap014, step 06 and 07. It gets increasingly
worse the longer sn-ap runs. The problem is that the time field is
updating slower than real time. This "current time" value is used in
SNAP to calculate ETC, running time, and other things. Some of the
symptoms are: jobs that don't start un-filling right away, jobs are
"done" before they finish un-filling (short jobs may even disappear
before they start unf illing) , and when the error is over 10 or 15
seconds (after running SNAP for as littleas five minutes) , some of the
Done jobs may show up in the Scheduled Jobs window. I looked at the code
and determined that the problem is SNAP'S use of PlayrateTimerCB in Live
mode. This resets a one-second timer every second. Of course, it takes
a few microseconds to respond to the timeout and restart the timer;
Thus, every second, "current_time" gets a few more microseconds behind.
The solution is to use REAL-TIME when running in Live mode. The libmrh
Virtual time class method (i.e. current_time = VirtualTime : :getTime ( ) )
should be used in the ActionWin: : set_time ( ) method when in Live mode.
This would update the "current time" variable at least once per second.
51
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sn-ap color map problems
Minor SNAP Visual
Enhancements
Big job kills sn-ap
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1059 SNAP error with 3 -digit
hours in ETC field
1060 SNAP still has memory
problems creating pixmaps
on some X-Terminals
1063 SNAP time clock runs slow
in LIVE mode
1073 SNAP legend window needs


































Database Editor Display JTF
SmartNet Runner crash JTF
Editor crash in pop-up menu 1995-
Q2
SmartNet halt due to Runner. JTF
Schedule Monitor Display lag JTF
Schedule Monitor problem JTF
Network Data editing IPPS
SmartNet schedule-monitor crash IPPS
Determine need for FOM class JTF



















SN BUG REPORT JTF
SN UPDATE REPORT JTF
Two ' exper_adds ' occur for one JTF




17 Newer version of libmrh desired IPPS
for SN
Brad Rust
18 Replacement of (GNU) String
class with MString class





Runner "Clear Schedule" not 1995 -Q3
successfully canceling jobs.









Saving Argset information in
Runner doesn't work properly.
Runner's "Save Argset" should
use File Selection Wiget
Improve security robustness of 1995
Message Object classes. Q3
IPPS 1 John Lima
IPPS 6 Wanda Lam








APPENDIX D. SCRs/AIs CLOSED BETWEEN <START/END DATE>
SCRs/AIs Closed
Between 01-MAR-1997 and 05-SEP-1997
Fri Sep 5 09:47:26 PDT 1997
SCR/AI # SCR Title DATE_CLOSED Assignee
SCR #1091 make a conversion routine for
"old" log file formats. 07-MAR-1997 Marc Weissman
SCR #1103 Minor modifications for NASA 07-MAR-1997 Matt Kussow
planning
SCR #1104 HP CC -O compiler crash on
utils.cc 07-MAR-1997 Matt Kussow
SCR #1108 Job network profile
information not getting to
scheduler. 07-MAR-1997 Matt Kussow
SCR #1100 sn-ap needs to handle jobs
that are already running. 07 -MAR- 1997 Marc Weissman
SCR #1089 Runner should start snap
instead of monitor. 17-MAR-1997 Wanda Lam
SCR #1111 test apOOl failed 17-MAR-1997 Marc Weissman
SCR #1114 correct improper for statement 17-MAR-1997
In sn/server/src/Model . cc
SCR #1116 Minor modifications for NASA 17 -MAR- 1997
planning II
SCR #1115 take libdebug stuff out of
libmrh 17-MAR-1997
SCR #1113 setup new style SN_VERSION for
main devel, and v2_7_a branch 17 -MAR- 1997
SCR #1110 sn-submit006 step 2 failed to 17-MAR-1997 John Lima
complete successfully on any
platform.
SCR #1120 reconfigure version string to 03-APR-1997 John Lima





Between 01-MAR-1997 and 05-SEP-1997
Fri Sep 5 09:47:26 PDT 1997
SCR/AI # SCR Title DATE_CLOSED Assignee
SCR #552 Secondary testing failed on 30-APR-1997 Brad Rust
test sn-controlOOl
SCR #1128 sn-submit fails to use 30-APR-1997 Matt Kussow
machineLogin . db
SCR #1132 Constraint's scheduler combine 30-APR-1997 Elaine Keith
Load enhancements
SCR #1095 RTUtils : : FindRsh needs
/usr/bin/rsh 30-APR-1997 Matt Kussow
SCR #1098 SmartNet Log File and Reader
headers 30-APR-1997 Marc Weissman
are allocated whenever included.
AI #56 Incorporate NASA data into 30-APR-1997 Matt Kussow
SmartNet database
SCR #1070 sn-submit002, stepOl failed on
guava 3 -APR- 1997 Wanda Lam
SCR #1011 sn-submit does not return to
command line prompt after
completion 30-APR-1997 Matt Kussow
SCR #1125 SmartNet Runner Core Dumps
When killing jobs during 29-MAY-1997 Matt Kussow
Runner003 Test on
SCR #110 9 Too much extraneous SNAP
output. 29-MAY-1997 Marc Weissman
SCR #1124 ETC not calculated correctly
with runner 29-MAY-1997 Matt Kussow
SCR #1003 SmartNet -Runner Taking Longer
than 2 seconds to load an
argument set 29-MAY-1997 Matt Kussow







Between 01-MAR-1997 and 05-SEP-1997
Fri Sep 5 09:47:26 PDT 1997
SCR Title DATE_CLOSED Assignee
minimum size too small for font.












EditorOOl Test COMMIT Button
Does Not Ungray
"sn-ap -d All -s -f new.snl
-play" produces file name
error
.
01-JUL- 1997 Terry Koyama
01-JUL-1997
Verbose is suppose to use cout 01-JUL-1997
(rather than cerr) as its output
stream
Replace all cerr's, cout ' s and













01-JUL- 1997 Terry Koyama
Runner001.aix.01 Step 4 New
.argset doesn't show up until 15-JUL-1997
restarting r
PDC Model database 15-JUL-1997
Add option to enable/disable 15-JUL-1997
learning in SN- submit
Improve performance of 15 -JUL- 1997










Between 01-MAR-1997 and 05-SEP-1997
Fri Sep 5 09:46:22 PDT 1997
SCR/AI # SCR Title
Date
Opened Status Assignee
SCR #1103 Minor modifications for
NASA planning






SCR #1107 Implement new asynchro-
nous API (Client and
Server) 07-MAR-1997
1997SCR #1108 Job network profile 07-MAR






SCR #1100 sn-ap needs to handle
jobs that are already-
running .




SCR #1111 test apOOl failed
SCR #1112 ap021 failed to read from
a log file (invalid format
error) 17-MAR-







SCR #1113 setup new style SN_
VERSION for main devel, 17 -MAR- 1997 CLOSED
and v2_7_a branch
SCR #1115 take libdebug stuff out 17-MAR-1997 CLOSED
Of libmrh
Marc Weissma
07-MAR-1997 CLOSED John Lima
07-MAR-1997 CLOSED Marc Weissma
Marc Weissma








Between 01-MAR-1997 and 05-SEP-1997
Fri Sep 5 09:46:22 PDT 1997
SCR/AI # SCR Title
Date
Opened Status Assignee
SCR #1003 SmartNet -Runner Taking 15 -APR
-
Longer than 2 Seconds to
Load an Argument Set
SCR #1040 SmartNet Client hangs
SCR #1128 sn-submit fails to use
machineLogin . db
SCR #1132 Constraint's scheduler
combine load enhancements
1997 CLOSED Matt Kussow
15-
-APR- 1997 CLOSED Terry Koyama
15-
-APR-1997 CLOSED Matt Kussow
15-
-APR-1997 CLOSED Elaine Keith
SCR #1121 runnerOOl step 5 failed 15 -APR
On all 3 platforms.
1997 CLOSED Wanda Lam
SCR #1119 create a network agent
For SmartNet
15-APR-1997 OPEN Marc Weissma
SCR #1124 ETC not calculated
Correctly with runner
SCR #1117 FileBox not working
Under GCC 2 .
7
15
-APR- 1997 CLOSED Matt Kussow
15
-APR- 1997 CLOSED John Lima
SCR #110 9 Too much extraneous SNAP 15 -APR- 1997 CLOSED Marc Weissma
output
.
SCR #1071 asynccommOlO failed on
SCR #1130
SunOS 15-APR-1997 CLOSED









Button Does Not Ungray
15-APR-1997 CLOSED Terry Koyama
SmartNet Log File and 15 -APR
-
Reader headers are allocated
whenever included.





Between Ol-MAR-1997 and 05-SEP-1997
Fri Sep 5 09:46:22 PDT 1997
SCR/AI # SCR Title
Date
Opened Status Assignee
SCR #1133 Simplify server Override 12 -JUN-1997
mechanism
OPEN Matt Kussow
SCR #1134 Improved network topologyl2- JUN-1997
representation
OPEN Francesca Mi
SCR #1135 sn-ap's LIVE command linel2- JUN-1997
option is useless and needs
to be modified.
CLOSED Terry Koyama
SCR #1136 Replace all cerr's, 17-JUN-1997
Cout's and other output statements
with debug and
CLOSED Terry Koyama
SCR #1141 Add option to enable/ 01-JUL-1997
Disable learning in SN-submit
CLOSED Marc Weissma




SCR #1138 Verbose is suppose to 01-JUL-1997
Use cout (rather than cerr) as
its output stream
CLOSED Terry Koyama
SCR #1139 Improve performance of 01-JUL-1997
f indEarliestFit function and
update of unit tes
CLOSED Francesca Mi
SCR #857 Runner001. aix. 01 Step 4 15-JUL-1997
New . argset doesn't show up
until restarting r
CLOSED Wanda Lam
SCR #1106 Upgrade to existing CPU 15-JUL-1997
Load agent
OPEN Marc Weissma
SCR #1143 smartnet- runner core 15-JUL-1997





APPENDIX E. TEAM POWER REPORT
Team Power Report (Page 1) September 05, 1997
SCR/AI Priority % Done Est.LOE Curr.LOE Last Week ALOE
John Lima Q4-1996( 01-JAN-1997 ) POE : 0.60
1) . AI#45 NORMAL 96 24 69 71
+ +
|
Hrs. Remaining: 9 Total LOE : 24 LOE Bal . : -99999 ALOEB : 3 |
+ +
Matt Kussow Q4-1996( 01-JAN-1997 ) POE: 0.40
2) . AI#21 NORMAL+ 90 40 26 28
3) . AI# 8 NORMAL 8 8
+ +
|
Hrs. Remaining: 9 Total LOE: 48 LOE Bal.: -19 ALOEB: -7 |
+ +
Francesca Mirabile Q3 ( 10-SEP-1997 ) POE: 0.50
4) . SCR#1134 NORMAL+ 22 320 208 945
+ +
| Hrs. Remaining: 35 Total LOE: 320 LOE Bal.: -95 ALOEB: -720 |
+ _ +
John Lima Q3 ( 10-SEP-1997 ) POE: 0.60
5) . SCR#1107 NORMAL+ 55 1600 1721 3129
+ +
| Hrs. Remaining: 35 Total LOE: 1600 LOE Bal.: -99999 ALOEB: -1387|
+ +
Marc Weissman Q3 ( 10-SEP-1997 ) POE: 0.50
6) . SCR#1106 NORMAL 20 80 16 80
+ +
|
Hrs. Remaining: 35 Total LOE: 80 LOE Bal.: -47 ALOEB: -47 |
+ +
Matt Kussow Q3 ( 10-SEP-1997 ) POE: 0.40
7) . SCR#1133 NORMAL 40 40
+ +
| Hrs. Remaining: 35 Total LOE: 40 LOE Bal.: -26 ALOEB: -26 |
+ +
Wanda Lam Q3 ( 10-SEP-1997 ) POE: 0.40
8) . SCR#1143 URGENT 80 8 6 7
+ +






APPENDIX F. SCR METRICS FOR PROBLEM SCRs
Version 2.1-beta
SCR Metrics for Problem SCRs
SCR Average Age Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 11/01/94 to 02/15/95)
Date: 11/17/97

















SCR OPEN Activity Report ( week resolution, problems only )
(Report covers 11/01/94 to 02/15/95)
Date: 11/17/97
SCR Priorities




























SCR Open/Close Rate Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 11/01/94 to 02/15/95)
Date: 11/17/97

















SCR Total OPEN Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 11/01/94 to 02/15/95)
Date: 11/17/97


















SCR Metrics for Problem SCRs
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SCR Average Age Report (week resolution, problems only)











SCR OPEN Activity Report ( week resolution, problems only
(Report covers 02/16/95 to 02/21/95)
Date: 11/17/97
SCR Priorities






SCR Open/Close Rate Report (week resolution, problems only)










SCR Total OPEN Report (week resolution, problems only)











SCR Metrics for Problem SCRs
SCR Average Age Report (week resolution, problems only]
(Report covers 02/22/95 to 05/04/95)
Date: 11/17/97













SCR OPEN Activity Report (week resolution, problems only)























SCR Open/Close Rate Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 02/22/95 to 05/04/95)
Date: 11/17/97












SCR Total OPEN Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 02/22/95 to 05/04/95)
Date: 11/17/97






















SCR Average Age Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 05/05/95 to 05/25/95)
Date: 11/17/97





SCR OPEN Activity Report ( week resolution, problems only
(Report covers 05/05/95 to 05/25/95)
Date: 11/17/97
















SCR Open/Close Rate Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 05/05/95 to 05/25/95)
Date: 11/17/97





SCR Total OPEN Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 05/05/95 to 05/25/95)
Date: 11/17/97








SCR Metrics for Problem SCRs
SCR Average Age Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 05/26/95 to 02/05/96)
Date: 11/17/97







































SCR OPEN Activity Report ( week resolution, problems only















































































SCR Open/Close Rate Report (week resolution, problems only!
(Report covers 05/26/95 to 02/05/96)
Date: 11/17/97







































SCR Total OPEN Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 05/26/95 to 02/05/96)
Date: 11/17/97
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SCR Metrics for Problem SCRs
SCR Average Age Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 02/06/96 to 04/22/96)
Date: 11/17/97














SCR OPEN Activity Report ( week resolution, problems only









SCR Open/Close Rate Report (week resolution, problems only
(Report covers 02/06/96 to 04/22/96)
Date: 11/17/97



































SCR Total OPEN Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 02/06/96 to 04/22/96)
Date: 11/17/97





































SCR Metrics for Problem SCRs
SCR Average Age Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 04/23/96 to 10/10/96)
Date: 11/17/97


























SCR OPEN Activity Report ( week resolution, problems only
(Report covers 04/23/96 to 10/10/96)
Date: 11/17/97
SCR Priorities






























SCR Open/Close Rate Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 04/23/96 to 10/10/96)
Date: 11/17/97














































SCR Total OPEN Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 04/23/96 to 10/10/96)
Date: 11/17/97



























SCR Metrics for Problem SCRs
SCR Average Age Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 10/11/96 to 03/05/97)
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Date: 11/17/97























SCR OPEN Activity Report ( week resolution, problems only
(Report covers 10/11/96 to 03/05/97)
Date: 11/17/97





























SCR Open/Close Rate Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 10/11/96 to 03/05/97)
Date: 11/17/97























SCR Total OPEN Report (week resolution, problems only).
(Report covers 10/11/96 to 03/05/97)
Date: 11/17/97

























SCR Metrics for Problem SCRs
SCR Average Age Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 03/06/97 to 10/01/97)
Date: 11/17/97
































SCR OPEN Activity Report ( week resolution, problems only )














































SCR Open/Close Rate Report (week resolution, problems only;
(Report covers 03/06/97 to 10/01/97)
Date: 11/17/97
































SCR Total OPEN Report (week resolution, problems only)
(Report covers 03/06/97 to 10/01/97)
Date: 11/17/97







































Lockdown Date: 08-MAR-96 Actual: 18-MAR-96
Release Date: 29-MAR-96 Actual: 22-APR-96
Status key:
1 - ill defined (unclear what is needed, or scope is to broad)
2 - ready for detailed design meetings
3 - ready for final design
4 - ready to be implemented (minimal design work remaining,
may denote relatively small code changes)






Mahen - Planning (pre-positioning)
EADSIM
JTF-ATD
Lesser priority: NASA, JMCIS, IBM/Cray, Boeing, NIH, NCAR, Bob Lucas
Requirements - implementation for March release:
Status SCRs
Highest priority
5 - Generational scheduling algorithm
754-C
5 - Dynamic information (network/cpu/ memory, disk space, etc) (ALL)
includes the use of this information in schedulers???
64 612-C
5 - Improved learning/Black hole problem (All)
760-C 158-H
5 - Complete Reimplementation of schedule monitor
fix performance problems/scalability, make it replay like,
add admin features???
761-C 766 376 635 491 72 73 314
5 - Rogue/Long running jobs (Client querying) (NSA)
758-C 661-C
4 - Linux port
634
5 - Intra-User Security
only work involving limiting job control to owning client
752-C
85
- CORBA Interface (JTF)
Resulting implementation is a CORBUS wrap which is not directly
part of the release
771
Lesser priority
5 - Easier DB configuration/manipulation/merging (ALL)
cleanup existing utility scripts and bring into release/manuals
764-C
3 - Command line clients (sn-submit, sn-control, etc)
mainly changes to runtime library and use of that library by sn-
submit
789-C 689-C 630 79 391-H
5 - Persistence/survivability of service (NSA)
only remove existing out of date recovery mechanism
762-C
2 - API Reimplementation
only complete design
765
Special cases (optional or TBD)
- Improvements to sn-replay
384-R 616-R 618-R 619-R 766-R
- MetaRMS (NSA, NSS)
NONE
- Planning (pre-positioning) (JTF, NASA)
NONE
- SmartNet-Commserver interaction
you mentioned this a couple of times, Richard, but I still need
clarification.
NONE
- Generic user "data" field in jobinfo struct (JTF, NSA)
someone needs to convince me why we want to do this
NONE
Requirements - Research emphasis:
Highest priority (hope to have some in Sept. release)
- Multitasking (JTF, JMCIS, IBM/Cray)
- Constraints Scheduling (Time, memory, latency, bandwidth) (JTF)
- Co-dependency between processes (JTF-ATD)
- Handling Interactive Jobs (ALL)
- Reservations (jobs, alternate usage, resource maintenance times) (JTF,
NSA)
- Multi-resource scheduling (subprocesses, machine clusters, networks)
(JTF)
- Auto-Partitioning (subprocesses or machine clusters)
- Multiple scheduling criteria (specifically user latency) (ALL)
- API Reimplementation
86






- Hard Priorities and overrides (NSA)
- Process migration
- DCE/RMS supported integration (NSA, NASA, NSS)
- Automatic definition of non-DB defined jobs (JTF, Cray, IBM)
.
- Master startup client
- Better installation/setup procedures
- Stable schedules and measurements (NASA)
- Multiuser scheduling interleaving (JTF)
- Rescheduling too often.
- Global overrides are not set-able through the DB file.
These next few (last, but not least on Mark's list) will automatically
be addressed somewhat in this release. I definitely want to take a peek
at our current performance capabilities (size of matrix, number of
clients) . However, none of them will be a primary focus of effort for
this release. Testing would be the exception. If anyone had a plan for
something that would significantly improve our testing process, it would






All other GUI modifications would be limited to fixes dictated by the
other requirements (listed above), minor bug fixes, and minor usability
enhancements. Most of these would be to the runner, maybe a few to the
editor, and probably none to the VHM monitor.
2.7
Version: 2.7
Lockdown Date: 03-SEP-96 Actual: 10-SEP-96
Release Date: 01-OCT-96 Actual: 10-OCT-96
Status key:
1 - ill defined (unclear what is needed, or scope is to broad)
2 - ready for detailed design meetings
3 - ready for final design
4 - ready for implementation
5 - ready for initial testing
6 - completed, ready for final testing
Customers /Projects
BC2A JTF NSA PCD NASA NSS
Requirements - implementation for October release:
Hrs
1. Finish initial SNAP implementation. Complete the new 160
logger, and integrate with SNAP.
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Dep: SCR: 53(a)
2. API Reimplementation. 160 6
Dep: SCR: 765
3. Scheduling around a fixed schedule. Includes admin control
120 6
through SNAP.
Dep: SCR: 462 463
4. Profiling and Optimization of server and schedulers. 80 6
Dep: SCR: 45(a)
5. Reimplementation of runtime library into C++ 80 6
Dep: SCR: 630 886 791
6. Implement user selectability of secondary subschedulers 80 6
(for Meta and Generational schedulers)
Dep: SCR: 926
7. Dynamic information - handle network latency information 32 6
Dep: SCR: 920
Continuing research not completed in this release
8. Handle multiple, job based, datahosts in
scheduling 160
Dep: SCR: 776 777
9. Workflow scheduling (scheduling on criteria other than 120
Eta score)
Dep: SCR:
10. MetaRMS (NSA, NSS) . 160
Dep: SCR:
11. Data staging for BC2A. This involves setting up an RMS
that keeps 160
track of the disk space available on a machine and manages
removal of old/low-priority files in favor of new/
high-priority ones.
Dep: SCR:
Items not included in this release
12. Implement automatic backup server capability 160
Dep: SCR: 929
13. Remove FomMatrix from server. This involves storing
scheduling 80
information (ETCs) in a job centric manner.
Dep: SCR: 928
14. Integration with ISIS and HORUS DCEs (NSA, NASA) 120
Dep: SCR:
88
Topics of Research Interest
- Multitasking (JTF, JMCIS, IBM/Cray)
- Constraints Scheduling (Time, memory, latency, bandwidth) (JTF)
- Co-dependency between processes (JTF-ATD)
- Handling Interactive Jobs (ALL)
- Reservations (jobs, alternate usage, resource maintenance times) (JTF,
NSA)
- Multi-resource scheduling (subprocesses, machine clusters, networks)
(JTF)
- Auto-Partitioning (subprocesses or machine clusters)
- Multiple scheduling criteria (specifically user latency) (ALL)
- More complete scheduling choices matrix (better modularization of
schedulers???)
- System security
- Hard Priorities and overrides (NSA)
- Process migration
- Automatic definition of non-DB defined jobs (JTF, Cray, IBM)
.
- Master startup client
- Better installation/setup procedures
- Stable schedules and measurements (NASA)
- Multiuser scheduling interleaving (JTF)
- Rescheduling too often.
- Global overrides are not set-able through the DB file.
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